R v Michael Louis Meridith

• Jurisdiction: Bermuda
• Judgment Date: 02 November 1990
• Docket Number: Criminal Jurisdiction 1990 No. 13
• Date: 02 November 1990
• Court: Supreme Court (Bermuda)

In the Supreme Court of Bermuda

Martyn Ward, J.

Criminal Jurisdiction 1990 No. 13

The Queen

and

Michael Louis Meridith

Mr. Stephen Harrison for the Crown

Mr. Julian Hall for the Defendant

Mills v CooperELR [1967] 2 QB 549

Connelly v DPPELR [1964] AC 1254

DPP v HumphreysELR [1977] AC 1

R v de la Chevotiere

Oxford City Justices, ex parte SmithUNK (1982) 75 Cr App R 200

R v Derby Crown Court ex parte BrooksUNK 80 Cr App R 164

Grant v DPPUNK (1980) 30 WIR 247

R v JamesonELR [1896] 2 QB 428

John v DPP [1986] LRC (Const.) 508

R v Kray (No.2)UNK (1969) 53 Cr App R 569

Criminal Code s. 504

Bermuda Constitution Order s. 6, s. 15

Premeditated murder — Application to quash indictment — Whether an abuse of the process of the court — Whether there can be a fair hearing due to pre-trial publicity

RULING

Martyn Ward, J.

Mr. Julian Hall, who with Mr. Delroy Duncan, appears for the Defendant Michael Louis Meridith, has applied to the Court at the outset of the trial, and before a jury has been sworn, to quash the indictment which contains a single count, that of premeditated murder, the most serious crime in the criminal calendar. He argues that the Court has jurisdiction to entertain his application and to make such an Order by virtue of the provisions of Section 504 of the Criminal Code, should do so because of sections 6 and 15 of the Bermuda Constitution Order, 1968, and because the Court has inherent jurisdiction to quash an indictment, or stay criminal proceedings, when there has been an abuse of the process of the Court.

Section 504 of the Criminal Code reads as follows:

‘504.(1) The accused person may before pleading apply to the Supreme Court to quash the indictment on the ground that it is calculated to prejudice or embarrass him in his defence to the charge, or that it is formally defective.

(2) Upon such motion the Supreme Court may quash the indictment, or may order it to be amended in such manner as the Court seems just, or may refuse the motion.’

The relevant parts of sections 6 and 15 of the Bermuda Constitution Order, 1968 provide as follows:

‘6(1) If any person is charged with a criminal offence, then, unless the charge is withdrawn, the case shall De afforded a fair hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial Court established by law.

(2) Every person who is charged with a criminal offence—

• (a) shall be presumed to be innocent until he is proved or has pleaded guilty; …

15.(1) If any person alleges that any of the foregoing provisions of this Chapter has been, is being or is likely to be contravened in relation to him, then, without prejudice to any other action with respect to the same matter which is lawfully available, that person may apply to the Supreme Court for redress.

(2) The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction—

• (a) to heat and determine any application made by any person in pursuance of subsection (1) of this section; ……..

and may make such orders, issue such writs and give such directions as it may consider appropriate for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement of any of the foregoing provisions of this Chapter to the protection of which the person concerned is entitled: provided that the Supreme Court shall not exercise its powers under this subsection if it is satisfied that adequate means of redress are or have been available to the person concerned under any other law.’

Subsection (4) of section 15 gives a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal and thence to the Privy Council from any final determination of any application or question by the Supreme Court under section 15, with a proviso which could have no application in this case.

Thirdly, and finally, Mr. Hall argues that this Court has jurisdiction in common with courts worldwide who apply English common law, who have accepted the dictum of Lord Parker, C.J. in Mills v. CooperELR(1967) 2 QB 549 (following the House of Lords decision in Connelly v. DPPELR(1964) A.C. 1254) when he said ‘… every Court has undoubtedly a right in its discretion to decline to hear proceedings on the grounds that they are oppressive and an abuse of the process of the Court’. The fact that Lord Parker regarded the discretionary right as ‘undoubted’ is interesting because the subject is not without controversy. Not all the members of the House in Connelly's case (supra) were agreed that Courts are entitled to stay lawful prosecutions, and other members of the House would have restricted the right to such well-known special pleas as “autrefois acquit” and “autrefois convict”. The House subsequently in DPP v. Humphrys(1977) A.C.I (H.L.) was still divided in its opinion on the subject, Lord Dilhorne regarding the right as severely circumscribed to cases where an accused was put in double jeopardy. Three members of the House acknowledged the discretionary right of the Court to intervene ‘if the prosecution amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court’ (per Lord Salmon, at p. 46) but it would appear that all three speeches were “obiter dicta”. For my part, having ruled as recently as 11th June, 1990, upon argument, although not as extensive as that presented to me in this case, that this Court does have such jurisdiction, I see no reason to resile from that today. I refer to a Ruling which I gave on the trial of Paul de la Chevotiere, or to be more accurate, and of not inconsiderable significance, on the retrial of that defendant, a fact which distinguishes considerably that case from this. But it follows, of course, that for the purposes of this trial I am prepared to accept Mr. Hall's argument that this Court, in addition to its express statutory jurisdiction to quash the indictment has inherent jurisdiction to do so, or to stay proceedings (which has much the same...