Whitter v DPP

• Jurisdiction: Bermuda
• Judgment Date: 21 June 2002
• Date: 21 June 2002
• Docket Number: Appellate Jurisdiction 2001 No. 92
• Court: Supreme Court (Bermuda)

In the Supreme Court of Bermuda

Ward, CJ

Appellate Jurisdiction 2001 No. 92

BETWEEN:

Jenene Whitter

Appellant

and

Director of Public Prosecutions

Respondent

Mr. Harshaw of Smith & Co. for the Appellant

Mrs. Vaucrosson of the DPP's Office for the Respondent

Road Traffic Act 1947, s. 37

Criminal Code, s. 452

Bermuda Constitution Order 1968, s. 71(3)

Driving without due care — No information laid before Magistrate — 6 month time limit — Delegation of power to sign certificates

JUDGMENT

On 27^th May 2002 after hearing both Counsel I allowed the appeal and said I would give my reasons later. I now proceed to do so.

On 10^th May 2001 a Summons R 815686 was issued to the appellant by Police Officer 848 directing her to appear at the Magistrates' Court, Hamilton on Monday 21^st May 2001 at 2.30 p.m.

The Summons reads:

‘The informant being duly sworn upon oath deposes and says at 9.20 hours on Saturday 6^th January 2001 Jenene Whitter at Lighthouse Hill, St. George's did commit the offence of driving without due care contrary to section 37 of the Road Traffic Act 1947 (as abbreviated).’

The appellant appeared as summoned. The information was not laid before the Magistrate through no fault of the appellant, and no order was made by the Magistrate.

On 6^th November 2001 an Information R 952799 was laid before the Magistrate charging the same offence as that alleged in the Summons R 815686. This Information in addition bears a stamped certificate as follows:

‘I certify that acts sufficient, in my opinion, to justify the institution of criminal proceedings in this case came to my notice on the 1^st November 2001.’ It was signed by J. Wolffe for the Director of Public Prosecutions.

The matter came before the Acting Senior Magistrate on 6^th and 9^th November 2001. Mr. Harshaw, Counsel for the Appellant, took the point that a prosecution for a summary offence must, unless otherwise expressly provided, be begun within a period of six months after the offence is committed. The offence was alleged to have been committed on 6^th January 2001 and the prosecution should have been begun no later than 5^th July 2001. He also referred to the 1^st Summons issued on 10^th May 2001—R 815686—which showed that the prosecuting authority had notice of the alleged offence.

Mrs. Smith, who appeared below for the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, asserted that the Office had no knowledge of the offence until 1^st November 2001. She argued that the...